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Introduction
Unemployment benefits are believed to contribute to the incidence and sustainability of unemployment by dampening the incentive to search for employment (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) . In this paper we highlight the importance of social externalities related to unemployment in the design of disbursement of unemployment benefits aimed at inducing people to seek jobs.
A large body of evidence from econometric studies, experimental economics, social psychology, and neuroscience (for example, Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010) indicates that humans routinely compare themselves with others who constitute their reference group. The evidence that the unemployed are highly spatially concentrated (Martin and Morrison, 2003; Wheeler, 2007) supports the notion that other unemployed people constitute their main reference group (Clark, 2003) ; physical nearness is a natural determinant of social proximity. Then, "a culture of unemployment" is likely to gain a foothold and lead to long-term unemployment. Statistics speak for themselves: according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in September 2014 the long-term unemployed (jobless for 27 weeks or more) accounted for 36.7 percent of the unemployed.
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The disincentive effect of unemployment benefits arises from income that is a substitute for wages lowering the marginal gain from employment and consequently dampening the incentive to search for work. Here, this line of reasoning is taken further. Rather than focusing on the level and duration of benefits, we look at the procedure for disbursing them. We study the effectiveness of a particular policy tool (conditional benefits) in lowering unemployment by influencing social comparisons and endogenous group formation. Evidence regarding the scarring effect of unemployment (for example, Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001) indicates that the wages of workers who land a job after a long spell of unemployment (the "newly employed") are significantly lower than the wages of workers who have been continuously employed (the "old" employees). Thus, the unemployed who successfully venture to enter the job market and who become newly employed feel the brunt of intensified comparisons with the "old" employees who earn more than they do. When unemployment benefits are disbursed 1 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm 2 unconditionally, participation in the job market is thereby penalized, whereas remaining unemployed partially shields individuals from unfavorable income comparisons. This "protection" weakens the incentive of the unemployed to seek work.
However, when receipt of the benefits is made conditional on engagement in an incentive-enhancing activity such as work under state-sponsored work schemes or participation in a work-site-based training program, every individual on benefits, regardless of his job search activity, feels the brunt of intensified unfavorable income comparisons as he compares himself more with the employed people. The policy of conditional benefits transforms a disincentive into an incentive: if open market employment pays better than work under state-sponsored work schemes, the unemployed who are made to perform such work and thereby to compare themselves more with the employed will become more inclined to seek work. Thus, we outline a revised benefits scheme which makes unemployed people more likely to compare themselves with the employed. In short, under conditional benefits the relative deprivation cost of finding work which arises from comparisons that the newly employed make with the "old" employees is already sunk and, thus, the marginal reward from landing a job is higher than when the unemployment benefits are disbursed unconditionally. 
Model and results
We distinguish between two reference groups of an unemployed individual: "old" employees (OE), each of whom earns wage oe w , and fellow unemployed (FU). In turn, the group FU consists of unemployed individuals who happened to find a job, becoming "newly employed" (NE), and earning a wage ne w , and of unemployed individuals who did not find a job, remain unemployed (U), and receive unemployment benefit u w . We 2 Our analysis could also add a rationale to public works programs such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme -a welfare program in India that guarantees 100 days of paid work a year for any unskilled rural laborer who wants it. When unemployment benefits are doled out unconditionally (Scenario 1 below) searching for work is discouraged because RD will be heightened if successful, whereas when the benefits are conditional (Scenario 2 below) exposure to RD arises even if the individual does not search for work. This shift in perspective decreases the RD penalty of getting a job and thereby encourages the search for gainful work. The magnitude of the wage penalty inflicted by a period of unemployment was estimated to lie between 5% and 20% (Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001) for British workers, and between 5% and 15% for American workers (Hamermesh, 1989) . With a gross unemployment benefit of less than 40% of preceding gross earnings in the majority of OECD countries (cf. OECD Statistics on Benefits and Wages; http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.htm) our "narrowing wage gap" assumption, namely, that the difference between the wage of an "old" employee and the wage of a newly employed individual is smaller than the difference between the wage of a newly employed individual and the unemployment benefit, is plausible. 
namely, the individual becomes employed with probability ( ) 
From the properties of the p and h functions it follows that U is concave: Under (2), the optimal effort level of an individual, 
Claim 1. Under unconditional benefits, the weight of the RD towards "old" employees to be experienced upon finding a job, ne OE   , acts as a disincentive to search for work.
Proof:
We first note that the higher the ne OE   , the less likely it is that (2) is satisfied.
When (2) 
e as the individual's strategy under some expectations about the effort choices of fellow unemployed. Thus, we search for strategies constituting symmetric Nash equilibria.
The optimal effort of the individual is a function of his belief as to how many other unemployed individuals will find work, namely 
Thus, if (5) 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) we get 
Thus, from the chain rule we get that 
The following claim delineates the effect of the policy on the search effort exerted by an unemployed individual. 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (10), we get 
Thus, treating optimal effort as a function of  ,
, we get that
The following claim ascertains the impact of the policy on the search effort that constitutes the symmetric Nash equilibrium. de dp  , is small in relation to the marginal gain in the probability from increasing search effort in the Nash equilibrium,
de p e dp     , then the institution of conditional benefits shifts the equilibrium upwards, namely, * * e e   .
a) The symmetric Nash equilibrium in the case of conditional benefits satisfies a condition equivalent to (4), that is,
The existence of a positive symmetric Nash equilibrium in the unconditional benefits regime entails its existence in the conditional benefits regime (cf. condition (5) and properties (7) and (8) (12) as
Applying the implicit function theorem to condition (13), we obtain 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we advance a theoretical hypothesis regarding the design of eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits aimed at manipulating unemployed individuals'
comparison groups and thereby their incentive to search for work on the open market.
One way to affect the comparison group of the unemployed is to dilute the cluster effect by moving some of the unemployed to areas populated by the employed. Andersson et al. (2014) report that in the US, proposals have recently been made to relocate residents of high unemployment neighborhoods to job-abundant neighborhoods, for example with a housing voucher program. But it is likely that such a policy will be
costly. An example of a more modest means of encouraging reference group substitution is as follows. Suppose that a specific task can be performed by teams of four or five workers. There are several teams already at work; some consist of four workers, others of five. There are four unemployed individuals who are to be brought into the sphere of the "old" employees. Each of these four should be attached to an existing four-worker team, rather than the four forming a new team by themselves. It is worth adding that already before Andersson et al. (2014) , several authors (Patacchini and Zenou, 2005; Gobillon and Selod, 2007; Kneebone, 2014) argued that a mismatch in geographical space is a cause of prolonged unemployment; if the unemployed could only be cheaply transported to where the jobs are, unemployment would take a beating. Here we address a "mismatch" in social space rather than to a mismatch in geographical space.
A concern could be raised that our reasoning fails to allow for the possibility that the unemployed who are in receipt of unemployment benefits are stressed because they feel they are a burden on their society and have no role to play in its affairs. Such unease could, in itself, constitute an incentive to get to work. But then, our proposed policy will have a perspective that works against the policy: being assigned to work could be interpreted by the unemployed as being given a role in society which, in turn, could weaken their incentive to seek work on the open market. However, on further reflection, this argument seems to break down for two reasons. First, had the "idle" unemployed been worried about receiving benefits for no work and about having no role to play in society, they could have volunteered to carry out socially valuable work. It is when and because they do not, that our proposed policy matters. Second, there is considerable evidence that unemployment creates adverse psychological effects that impede or depress rather than energize or boost the drive to seek work (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998 , and references cited therein). But then, the case for our proposed policy becomes even stronger: once given work to do, the unemployed regain self-esteem, feel that they do contribute to their society and, overall, are on a sounder platform to initiate a drive to obtain work on the open market. Nonetheless, studying the hearts and minds as well as 11 the frustrations and aspirations of the unemployed constitutes a fertile ground for followup research.
